The First Amendment largely protects the rights to freedom of expression and freedom of the press.  Freedom of expression means freedom of expression and public opinion without censorship, interference and restraint by the government.     The term “freedom of expression” in the First Amendment includes the decision to say anything or not.  The free press means the right of the individual to express himself through the publication and dissemination of information, ideas and opinions without interference, coercion or prosecution by the government.   The Supreme Court of Chicago Police Dept. Mosley (1972) said: “Most importantly, the First Amendment means that the government does not have the power to limit expression because of its message, ideas, purpose or content. […] In order to allow the further construction of our politics and culture and to ensure the realization of oneself for everyone, the right to express every thought is guaranteed to our citizens, without censorship of the state. The essence of this prohibited censorship is the control of content. Any limitation of expression activity because of its content would totally undermine “the country`s deep commitment to the principle that debate on public issues must be unbridled, robust and wide open.”  The need for an imperative government interest was taken in the department of employment v. Smith (1990), , who had no such interest in a neutral law of general application that, by chance, concerns a religious practice, as opposed to a law that seeks a particular religious practice (which requires an imperative public interest).  In the church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v.
City of Hialeah (1993), , in which the court developed the importance of the “neutral law of general application” the Supreme Court ruled that Hialeah had adopted a decree prohibiting ritual slaughter, a central practice for the health religion, while providing exceptions for certain practices such as kosher slaughter. Since the regulation is not of “general application,” the Tribunal held that it must have an imperative interest that it did not have and was therefore declared unconstitutional.  In that case, the Supreme Court also found that investigations into whether laws are discriminatory on the basis of religion do not end with the text of the laws in issue. The facial neutrality of laws (i.e. laws that are clearly neutral in their language but actually discriminate against a particular group) is not determinative in these investigations, because both the free practice clause and the establishment clause go beyond facial discrimination.  The Supreme Court stated that “[o]iicial action that targets religious conduct for distinctive treatment cannot be protected by mere compliance with the requirement of facial neutrality” and “[t]he protection of the freedom of exercise clause against state hostility which is both masked and hasty.”  The neutrality of a law is also suspect when First Amendment freedoms are restricted to prevent isolated collateral damage from being itself prohibited by direct regulation.  The Tribunal also stated that “the free exercise clause protects religious observers from unequal treatment,” Hobbie v.